The 'knowledge politics' of democratic peace theory

How do academic ideas influence US foreign policy, under what conditions and with what consequences? This article traces the rise, ‘securitisation’ and political consequences of democratic peace theory (DPT) in the United States by exploring the work of Doyle, Diamond and Fukuyama. Ideas influence US foreign policy under different circumstances, but are most likely to do either during and after crises when the policy environment permits ‘new thinking’, or when these ideas have been developed through state-connected elite knowledge networks, or when they are (or appear paradigmatically congenial to) foreign policymakers’ mindsets, or, finally, when they become institutionally-embedded. The appropriation of DPT by foreign policymakers has categorised the world into antagonistic blocs – democratic/non-democratic zones of peace/turmoil – as the corollary to a renewed American mission to make the world ‘safer’ through ‘democracy’ promotion. The roles of networked organic intellectuals – in universities and think tanks, for instance – were particularly important in elevating DPT from the academy to national security managers

Deep Theorizing in International Relations

This paper starts from the observation that, at a time when the popularity of grand theory is in decline among IR scholars, they do not agree on what they mean by theory. In fact, the celebration of theoretical pluralism is accompanied by the relative absence of a serious conversation about what ‘theory’ is, could, or should be. Taking the view that we need such a conversation, this puts forward the notion of ‘deep theorizing’. Countering both the shallow theorizing of modern scholarship that conflates theory with scientific method, and the postmodern view that abstract narratives must be deconstructed and rejected, it offers a reading of the parameters along which substantial theorizing proceeds. Specifically, it suggests that ‘deep theorizing’ is the conceptual effort of explaining (inter)action by developing a reading of drives/basic motivations and the ontology of its carrier through an account of the human condition, that is, a particular account of how the subject (the political actor) is positioned in social space and time. The paper illustrates the plausibility of this meta-theoretical angle in a discussion of realist, liberal and postcolonial schools of thought

The international politics of geoengineering: The feasibility of Plan B for tackling climate change

Geoengineering technologies aim to make large-scale and deliberate interventions in the climate system possible. A typical framing is that researchers are exploring a ‘Plan B’ in case mitigation fails to avert dangerous climate change. Some options are thought to have the potential to alter the politics of climate change dramatically, yet in evaluating whether they might ultimately reduce climate risks, their political and security implications have so far not been given adequate prominence. This article puts forward what it calls the ‘security hazard’ and argues that this could be a crucial factor in determining whether a technology is able, ultimately, to reduce climate risks. Ideas about global governance of geoengineering rely on heroic assumptions about state rationality and a generally pacific international system. Moreover, if in a climate engineered world weather events become something certain states can be made directly responsible for, this may also negatively affect prospects for ‘Plan A’, i.e. an effective global agreement on mitigation

The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution'

The question of whether global capitalism can resolve the earth system crisis rests on the (im)possibility of ‘absolute decoupling’: whether or not economic growth can continue indefinitely as total environmental impacts shrink. Ecomodernists and other techno‐optimists argue for the feasibility of absolute decoupling, whereas degrowth advocates show that it is likely to be neither feasible in principle nor in the timeframe needed to ward off ecological tipping points. While primarily supporting the degrowth perspective, I will suggest that the ecomodernists have a wildcard in their pocket that hasn’t been systematically addressed by degrowth advocates. This is the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, which refers to convergent innovations in biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and other developments. However, I will argue that while these innovations may enable some degree of absolute decoupling, they will also intensify emerging risks in the domains of biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization. Overall, these technologies will not only place unprecedented destructive power in the hands of non‐state actors but will also empower and incentivize states to create a global security regime with unprecedented surveillance and force mobilization capacities. This reinforces the conclusion that mainstream environmental policies based on decoupling should be reconsidered and supplanted by alternative policy trajectories based on material‐energetic degrowth, redistribution, and technological deceleration

Racial and Imperial Thinking in International Theory and Politics: Truman, Attlee and the Korean War

- Connects the background ideas of race and empire to world politics - Uses case of Truman and Attlee in the Korean War - Argues that liberal-realist internationalists’ assumptions about the US-led post-war order obscure those background ideas and fail to understand the character of the post-war order - Argues liberal-realist internationalism is akin to a legitimating ideology rather than an explanatory theory - Argues that such failings render liberal internationalism inadequate to explain or prescribe ways for the United States/West to manage the ‘rise of the rest’ today This article connects the background ideas of race and empire to world politics by looking at the world views and actions of Truman and Attlee in the Korean War. The article argues that liberal-realist internationalists’ assumptions about the US-led post-war order obscure those background ideas and fail to understand the character of the post-war order. I consider two kinds of ‘background ideas’—policy-makers’ and those embedded in liberal internationalism. Put together, these ideas render liberal-realist internationalism akin to a legitimating ideology rather than an explanatory theory. More broadly, and in the longer run, such failure to comprehend the character of the post-war order, and the roles of race, empire and periphery war in it, renders the theory inadequate to explain or prescribe ways for the United States/West to manage the ‘rise of the rest’ today

Is global democracy possible?

Scepticism about the possibility of a democratically governed global polity is often rooted in beliefs about ‘necessary conditions’. Some democracy scholars consider a transition to global democracy to be incompatible with necessary conditions for democratic governance, while some International Relations scholars consider it to be incompatible with necessary conditions for international structural change. This article assesses hypotheses and evidence about democratic transitions within states and transformations in the interaction among states and concludes that arguments based on necessary conditions are not compelling. This suggests that global democracy may be unlikely but it is not impossible